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The managerial ombudsman* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article identifies a major development in the role and practice of the ombudsman. It argues that the 
New Public Management practices that have transformed public administration in the last 30 years have 
led to a more managerial approach to the ombudsman's work. The article's argument is developed 
through analysis of an empirical case study of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman, which 
illustrates how the aims and techniques of managerialism have been deployed in the ombudsman 
context. The article evaluates the significance of these developments for the ombudsman institution and 
for the wider justice system. It examines the risks and opportunities inherent in this turn to 
managerialism and whether it represents a departure from the ombudsman’s mission or a necessary 
adaptation to a changed world of public administration. In identifying the rise of the ‘managerial 
ombudsman’, the article provides a new framework for conceptualising developments in the modern 
ombudsman institution.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ombudsman offices are independent bodies that investigate complaints from citizens about 
government administration and provide additional remedies to those traditionally available in courts. 
Having been developed in Scandinavia in the 19th century, the ombudsman institution began to spread 
around with the world in the mid-20th century and is now a feature of citizens’ redress in most 
jurisdictions. The first UK ombudsman was created in 1967 and was intended primarily as an aid to 
parliamentarians in their traditional role of redressing their constituents’ grievances. This function was 
reflected in the ombudsman’s modus operandi, which focused on formal complaint investigations, 
reporting outcomes to Parliament, and making non-binding recommendations designed to have political 
rather than legal effects. This approach, described as the “officer of Parliament” model,1 began to come 
under pressure, as volumes of complaints increased and as new ombudsman offices were set up, in areas 
like health and local government, without a distinct parliamentary link.  Increasingly, having been first 
thought of as an elite remedy, a ‘cutting edge’ for the prime benefit of MPs,2 UK ombudsman offices 
adopted a role more akin to a small claims court, providing mass redress of public service complaints. 
                                                          
1 C. Harlow, ‘Ombudsmen: hunting lions or swatting flies’ in M. Hertogh and R. Kirkham, Handbook of 
ombudsman research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018). The references to small claims court and inspector 
general approaches below are also discussed by Harlow.  
2  G. Drewry and C. Harlow, ‘A ‘cutting edge’? The Parliamentary Commissioner and MPs’ (1990) 53 The Modern 
Law Review 6. 
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Despite the focus of ombudsman statutes remaining on formal investigations and reports, ombudsman 
offices responded to their growing workloads by using less formal methods and seeking increasingly to 
resolve complaints without formal reporting to Parliament. At the same time – despite not having a 
clear statutory remit to do so – UK ombudsman offices have moved towards the so-called “inspector 
general” model, through the investigation of groups of ‘big cases’ and the issuing of good practice 
guidance seeking to achieve a broader systemic impact on public administration. The result of these 
developments have been something of a hotchpotch, with a lack of clarity over what function the UK’s 
ombudsman offices are, and should be, fulfilling, and the means they should employ for doing so. 
It is in this context that this article argues that, in the last 30 years, a distinctive model of 
ombudsman practice has developed. Recalling Resnick’s identification of the ‘managerial judge’,3 the 
article argues that an important ombudsman model in the UK is now that of the ‘managerial 
ombudsman’.4 Indeed, the article contends that understanding the current approach to the ombudsman 
institution in the UK as a response to – and a part of – the post-1990s managerialisation of public 
services provides a fresh and insightful means of conceptualising the modern ombudsman institution. 
An outline of the managerial ombudsman may be briefly stated. It involves, first, the adoption of 
managerialist language to describe the role of the ombudsman and its relationship to public 
administration. Second, it recasts the aims of the ombudsman as being to provide satisfaction to 
‘consumers’ of public services and emphasises its role in supporting public managers to improve 
services. Third, it internalises techniques of modern managerialism in its own organisation, for example, 
using Key Performance Indicators, targets, customer satisfaction surveys, and other approaches 
emphasising efficiency in providing an ombudsman ‘service’. Fourth, it is influenced by complaint 
handling in the private sector, including an emphasis on ‘informal resolution’, rather than the traditional 
approach of conducting public accountability investigations.5 Lastly, the major emphasis of the 
managerial ombudsman rests on the idea of learning from complaints, with this agenda seen as a way 
of carving out a legitimate ‘domain’6 for ombudsman offices within a reformed public administration. 
 The article advances its argument in two ways. Part II provides theoretical context and aims to 
demonstrate the influence of consumerist and managerial agendas in the development of the UK’s 
complaint handling and ombudsman systems. Part III then describes a small-scale empirical case study, 
which illustrates how the managerial ombudsman model is currently being developed in the UK. The 
case study considers developments in the role of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman. Briefly, this 
                                                          
* The authors are grateful to […] 
3 J. Resnick, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374. 
4 This article is concerned with the ombudsman institution in the UK. At the same time, the argument is likely to 
be of interest in other jurisdictions where there have been large-scale managerial reforms of public administration 
and where managerialism becomes a more important feature in the design and operation of justice systems. 
5 J. Gulland, ‘Taking complaints seriously: the role of informality in complaints about public services’ (2011) 10 
Social Policy and Society 4. 
6 S. Gilad, ‘Exchange without capture: The UK financial ombudsman service’s struggle for accepted domain’ 
(2008) 86 Public Administration 4. 
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involves an enhanced role in setting and monitoring standards for complaint handling, simplifying 
complaint procedures, and supporting the development of good practice in complaint handling. The 
article argues that this represents a significant extension to the managerial ombudsman model, 
particularly in relation to (a) the way that the ombudsman’s mission has shifted further towards a 
managerial concern with organisational learning, and (b) in the novel methodologies (such as 
performance indicators, benchmarking, and consultancy) which have been developed to support the 
ombudsman’s expanded mission. This case study, it will be argued, is significant in the UK given the 
development of similar approaches in the devolved jurisdictions of Wales and Northern Ireland. It is 
also significant internationally, because it allows for the identification of a distinct model of 
ombudsman practice and novel methodologies. Drawing on documentary analysis and qualitative 
interviews, the case study provides insights into the development, risks, and opportunities of the 
managerial ombudsman model. 
 The article is not restricted to conceptualising the development of the ‘managerial ombudsman’, 
but also provides a critical evaluation, which is both philosophical and practical. The philosophical 
discussion draws on critiques of consumerism and private sector practice in public services and raises 
questions about the appropriateness of the ombudsman’s co-option of managerial values and 
techniques. Is the managerial ombudsman a reductive and debased version of the ombudsman’s original 
mission? Or does it represent a pragmatic and powerful adaptation to a changed world of public 
administration? The practical critique relates to the pitfalls of adopting managerialist language, goals, 
and methodologies. Can ombudsman offices ‘satisfy’ consumers of public services in the way their 
private sector counterparts might? And can ombudsman offices really deliver on the potential for 
complaints to lead to better public services? The particular focus of the article, here, is on the 
opportunities and challenges of the growing emphasis on learning from complaints. The article argues 
that the opportunity of this learning agenda is to provide an escape from the traditional tension haunting 
the ombudsman’s role, between retrospective accountability and prospective regulation.7 The main risks 
involve the danger of the ombudsman becoming too proactively drawn into public service improvement 
and the well-known challenges that stand in the way of learning in public services.8  
 The article ends by reflecting on the significance of the case study and the managerial 
ombudsman approach. Globally, the major story of the ombudsman’s development has been a growing 
emphasis on human rights, good governance, and the rule of law,9 which stands quite apart from the 
managerial focus the article identifies in the UK. Here, the article explores whether the models are 
simply in opposition or whether there is potential for them to be reconciled. Finally, the article ends by 
                                                          
7 G. Smith, ’Citizen oversight of independent police services: Bifurcated accountability, regulation creep, and 
lesson learning’ (2009) 3 Regulation & governance 4. 
8 C. Gill, ‘What can government learn from the ombudsman?’ in M. Hertogh and R. Kirkham (eds), The handbook 
of ombudsman research, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018 forthcoming). 
9 L. Reif, The ombudsman, good governance, and the international human rights system (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004) 
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contextualising the managerial ombudsman within recent reforms of the justice system. Here, the article 
argues that the managerial ombudsman model can be situated more precisely as part of a broader 
enterprise of managerialist justice system reform. The wider significance of the model analysed in this 
article, then, is to provide a case study of managerial reform that contributes to understanding the ways 
in which justice systems are changing in the modern managerial state. 
 The article is structured in three parts. Part II provides the theoretical context. Part III presents 
the case study methodology and findings. Part IV discusses the findings and concludes by analysing the 
significance of the managerial ombudsman model. 
 
II. THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
This part of the article provides context for the case study in Part III. Section A argues that modern 
developments in complaint handling and the ombudsman’s role have been driven by a New Public 
Management (NPM) agenda. Section B makes the argument that the contemporary focus of the 
ombudsman is on ‘lesson-learning’ and that this focus comes with opportunities and risks. Section C 
ends by reviewing performance management techniques, such as performance measurement and 
benchmarking that are being applied for the first time in the ombudsman context. 
 
A. Complaint handling in UK public services and the managerial paradigm 
 
Developments in complaint handling in the United Kingdom 
 
For analytical clarity, and despite some oversimplification, it is helpful to consider modern 
developments in public service complaint handling as occurring in three broad phases (see table 1 
below). Phase 1 involved the development of external procedures and accompanied the significant 
growth of the welfare state in the post-war period. This phase conforms to a ‘legal model’10 of complaint 
management, supplemented by the ombudsman’s ‘administrative model’,11 associated with values such 
as due process and fair treatment. Phase 2 involved the development of internal procedures, this time 
accompanying the New Public Management (NPM) reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. This phase 
conformed to a ‘managerial model’, associated with values such as customer service and government 
responsiveness.12 Finally, the third phase has involved attempts to reform developments of phase 1 and 
phase 2, with an emphasis on how the whole complaints ‘system’ operates. This phase conforms to a 
systemic-managerial model, where managerialism remains at the heart of complaint handling, but more 
                                                          
10 J. Allsop and K. Jones, ‘Withering the citizen, managing the consumer: complaints in healthcare settings’ (2008) 
7 Social Policy and Society 2. 
11 D. Clark, ‘Managerialism, administrative justice and public service reform in Britain’ (1999) 65 International 
Review of Administrative Sciences 4. 
12 Ibid. 
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emphasis is placed on the system’s coherence, cost, and effectiveness. The paragraphs below analyse 
each phase. 
 
Phase Time period Key development Underlying values 
 
Model 
1 1950s -1970s Growth in external mechanisms 
with either a legal or 
administrative focus e.g. 
tribunals and ombudsman 
 
Rule of law, due 
process, citizen 
rights, independence, 
public adjudication, 
fair treatment, good 
administration 
Legal - 
administrative -
external 
2 1980s – 
1990s  
Internal, managerially-focused 
complaint mechanisms e.g. 
complaint procedures, internal 
review processes 
Flexibility, customer 
service, government 
responsiveness, 
service improvement 
 
Managerial - 
internal 
3 2000s – 
2010s 
Systemic attempts to reform 
phase 1 and 2 mechanisms e.g. 
Tribunals Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007, Public 
Services Reform Scotland Act 
2010 
 
Efficiency, 
simplification, 
coherence, value for 
money 
 
Systemic -
managerial  - 
holistic 
 
Table 1: developments in public service complaint handling 
 
In phase 1, a growing state led to a concern with limiting bureaucratic power and ensuring the 
availability of remedies. The emphasis was on external redress, with the provision of appeal rights and 
independent tribunals drawing on legal principles and formal procedures.13 Franks confirmed in 1957 
that tribunals formed part of the adjudicative arm of the state and should conform to principles of 
fairness, openness, and impartiality. A ‘new legalism’ could be seen in arrangements for public sector 
redress in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, emphasising principles of legality, natural justice, and 
rationality.14 Such approaches to redress were in keeping with Weberian notions of bureaucracy, with 
their emphasis on impartiality, rationality, and governance by rules. The introduction of the 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in 1967, while seeking to ensure that redress was 
available for poor administration that was nevertheless lawful, continued to emphasise a need for 
formal, external mechanisms of redress. This was supplemented in the National Health Service Re-
Organisation Act 1993 with the creation of the Health Services Commissioner as an ombudsman for 
health service complaints and in the Local Government Act 1974 with the creation of the Commission 
for Local Administration as an ombudsman for local government. Hence the focus in the post-war 
period was on the expansion of external mechanisms for redress, emphasising independence in the 
adjudication of complaints according to law and good administration.  
Phase 2 saw a shift in public administration and the complaints machinery. Clark refers to this 
second wave being driven by more ideological and managerial agendas.15 Adler meanwhile refers to 
public sector reforms leading to a raft of new models of administrative justice entering bureaucratic 
practice, including managerial, consumerist, and market models.16 These reforms can be seen as part of 
a trend across Europe to enhance mechanisms for consumer voice.17 Complaints became re-imagined 
as means by which the aims of NPM – including using market mechanisms and a consumer orientation 
to public services – could be furthered. Indeed, complaint mechanisms became tools for remedying 
inefficient administration and creating more demanding consumers of public services.18 Just as the NPM 
reforms imported private sector practice to management, so complaint handling mechanisms 
emphasised an internal managerialist focus rather than one which provided independent public 
adjudication. Adler’s19 analysis is that consumerist approaches to decision-making were associated with 
the ‘voice’ mode of redress and compensation through consumer charters.20  
Indeed, the landmark development was the Citizen’s Charter, which had two aims: to 
encourage public services to publish standards for delivery and provide mechanisms to challenge 
failures to meet standards.21 Drawing on Halliday and Scott’s22 cultural analysis of administrative 
justice, these developments can be seen as resulting in a shift in both bureaucratic practice and redress 
from an ideal type emphasising hierarchism (valuing expertise and the implementation of ‘higher 
orders’) to an ideal type conforming more closely to individualism (valuing bargaining and consumer 
                                                          
15  Ibid. 
16 M. Adler, ‘Understanding and analysing administrative justice’, in M. Adler (ed), Administrative Justice in 
Context (Oxford: Hart, 2010). 
17 S. Jilke and S. Van de Walle, ‘Two track public services? Citizens' voice behaviour towards liberalized services 
in the EU15’ (2013) 15 Public Management Review 4. 
18 P. Birkinshaw, ‘Grievances, remedies and the state—revisited and re-appraised’ in M. Adler (ed) Administrative 
justice in context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
19 N 16 above. 
20 ‘Voice’ is a concept developed by Hirschman to describe one of three typical behaviours resulting from 
dissatisfaction with a service and refers to expressing dissatisfaction (such as through complaining). A Hirschman, 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1972). 
21 The Citizen’s Charter: Raising The Standard, Cm 1599 (1991). 
22 S. Halliday and C. Scott, ‘A cultural analysis of administrative justice’ in M. Adler (ed) Administrative justice 
in context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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responsiveness). Following the introduction of the Charter, the Cabinet Office set up a Complaint 
Taskforce, which drew heavily on private sector practice to draw up principles for complaint handling.23 
Since the Charter, internal complaints procedures have become universal in the public sector.24  
Phase 3 combined managerial concerns with a more holistic approach. Attention came to rest 
on two issues: the design and effectiveness of complaint systems. This systemic approach can be seen 
in attempts at improving cooperation between local and national ombudsman offices25 and the creation 
of the Cross Government Complaints Forum.26 The UK Parliament’s Public Administration Select 
Committee27 also began taking a greater interest in complaint handling.28 A major contribution to the 
systemic approach came with the 2004 White Paper, Transforming Public Services: Complaints, 
Redress, and Tribunals, which called for a more rational and cost-effective system.29 The White Paper’s 
vision was partly implemented in the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007, but only in relation 
to the tribunal system. Indeed, the adoption of a more holistic and systemic approach is best 
demonstrated in the rationalisation of tribunals into a unified court and tribunal service. In comparison, 
despite continuing concerns about internal complaint handling and the ombudsman, reform in these 
areas has been limited.30 A draft ombudsman reform Bill has been published but the timetable for 
introducing a Bill to Parliament is unclear.31  
At a UK level, therefore, concern with systemic issues increased, but reform was imperfectly 
realised outwith the tribunal sector. This contrasts with devolved nations, where ombudsman and 
complaint handling systems have been subject to substantial systemic-managerial reform. A key 
development was the creation of ‘one-stop-shop’ ombudsman offices, with integrated jurisdictions 
covering most public services.32 Devolved reform also tackled internal complaint handling. In Wales, 
a single portal for complaining about public services was created. The Public Service Ombudsman for 
Wales was also given a non-statutory remit to standardise complaint processes. Meanwhile, in Scotland, 
following reforms prompted by the Crerar Review,33 the Scottish Public Service Ombudsman was given 
                                                          
23 M. Blackmore, ‘Complaints Within Constraints: A Critical Review and Analysis of the Citizen's Charter 
Complaints Task Force’ (1997) 12 Public Policy and Administration 3. 
24 N 18 above. 
25 Draft Public Services Ombudsman Bill CBP 7864 (2016) 
26 J. Gulland, ‘Independence in complaints procedures: lessons from community care’, (2009) 31 Journal of Social 
Welfare & Family Law 1. 
27 Now the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee. 
28 More complaints please! HC229 (2014) 
29 Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress, and Tribunals CM6243 (2004). 
30 For example, P. Dunleavy, S. Bastow, J. Tinkler, S. Goldchluk, E. Towers ‘Joining up citizen redress in UK 
central government’ in M. Adler (ed.), Administrative justice in context, (Oxford: Hart, 2010) and R. Gordon, 
Better to serve the public: Proposals to restructure, reform, renew and reinvigorate public services ombudsmen 
(Cabinet office, 2014). 
31 N 25 above. 
32 C. Gill, ‘The evolving role of the ombudsman: a conceptual and constitutional analysis of the" Scottish solution" 
to administrative justice’ (2014) Public law. 
33 L. Crerar. Independent review of regulation, audit, inspection, and complaint handling. (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government, 2007). 
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a new statutory function to oversee standardised complaints procedures across Scottish public 
services.34 These reforms are the subject of the case study below.  
 
Critiques of the managerialist complaint handling model 
 
Critiques of these developments have focused on the values underlying managerial complaint handling. 
As Allsop and Jones argue,35 complaint systems are not value free and there have been concerns about 
managerial values encroaching into justice provision. Despite the current hold of managerialism, 
alternatives are possible. For instance, complaints are described by Chen et al. as fundamental aspects 
of democracy and means of creating a more participatory state. 36 Brewer meanwhile conceptualises 
them as channels through which citizens can hold government to account and build confidence in 
institutions.37 O’Brien – referring to public service ombudsman offices – sees their role being to 
contribute to public governance through processes of deliberative decision-making.38 Such democratic 
visions are, however, under-developed in practice. Rather than being underpinned by citizenship and 
democratic participation, developments in the UK show a movement away from those values. Indeed, 
referring to healthcare complaints, Allsop and Jones argue that such models have been displaced by one 
‘based on corporate sector practice that views complaint handling as a way of retaining customers and 
organisational learning’.39 This approach is a ‘consumer-populist variant’ of NPM, combining 
managerialism and consumerism.40  
 Brewer identifies the problems with this approach as its emphasis on customer satisfaction at 
the expense of citizens’ rights, its weakening of public service values, and its move away from the rule 
of law.41 The major concern with consumerism is its reduction of the multi-dimensional concept of 
citizenship to one based on self-interest and transactional understandings of public provision as ‘service 
delivery’.42 These concerns are reflected in wider critiques of consumerism in public services. In 
particular, reconceptualising citizens as consumers may marginalise the excluded, allowing the 
powerful in society to distort services in their favour,43 creating a ‘two track public service’.44 An 
                                                          
34 N 35 above. 
35 N 10 above. 
36 D. Chen, T. Huang, and N. Hsaio, ‘The management of citizen participation in Taiwan: a case study of Taipei 
city government's citizen complaints system’ (2003) 26 International Journal of Public Administration, 5. 
37 B. Brewer, ‘Citizen or customer? Complaints handling in the public sector’ (2007) 73 International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 4. 
38 N. O'Brien, ‘What future for the ombudsman?’ (2015) 86 The Political Quarterly 1. 
39 N 10 above. 
40 N 11 above. 
41 N 372 above. 
42 C. Needham, ‘Customer care and the public service ethos. Public Administration’ (2006) 84 Public 
Administration 4. 
43 T. Jung, ‘Citizens, co-producers, customers, clients, captives? A critical review of consumerism and public 
services’ (2010) 12 Public Management Review 3. 
44  N 17 above. 
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example of the potential distortive effects of complaint systems has recently been provided by Hubeau, 
who discusses the way in which ombudsman systems have the potential to create “Matthew effects” 
that take resources away from the most needy.45 While the more powerful in society have always been 
in a better position to capture public services, the expansion of consumerist approaches emphasising 
consumer empowerment and the growth of complaint procedures have the potential to exacerbate this. 
Such approaches also exclude others interested in public service delivery: future service users; excluded 
users and non-users; and citizens at large.46  
 Another critique focuses on informality, which Gulland argues recasts complaints as consumer 
issues to be ‘sorted out’.47 Goldsmith sees informality as a response to managerial demands for 
efficiency,48 while Nader argues that informality is a means of ‘cooling out’ complainants.49 Gilad 
refers to this as ‘expectations management’ where the emphasis is on re-adjusting the (perceived to be) 
excessive demands of citizens.50 The major critique of informality is that it lacks transparency and 
reduces complaints to atomised, transactional matters: serious issues are not brought to public attention, 
and do not lead to the democratic discussions advocated by O’Brien.51 A further concern with 
informality is the suspicion that it is driven by cost reduction. Gulland makes this point in discussing 
the reframing of informality as ‘proportionality’, with proportionality becoming code for ensuring that 
complaints are dealt with at the lowest cost.52  
Clark has provided a more balanced account and argues that rather than being in opposition to 
the traditional external mechanisms of administrative law, consumerist approaches may in fact offer an 
internal complement to external remedies.53 Consumerist ideas of individual consumer rights can be 
seen as fitting with a legalistic model of individual redress and potentially enhancing the rights of 
citizens in relation to the state, rather than weakening them through an inferior conception of citizenship. 
Similarly, dispute resolution scholars have identified benefits to be derived from informal approaches 
to complaints, which can provide quicker, less stressful, more consensual results that can benefit both 
                                                          
45 B. Hubeau, ‘The Profile of Complainants: How to Overcome the 'Matthew Effect'?’ in M. Hertogh and R. 
Kirkham, Handbook of ombudsman research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018). A ‘Matthew effect’ is a concept 
that describes situations where a facility, apparently designed for everyone, is in fact more likely to widen the gap 
between those with resources and those without. The term derives from the Parable of the Talents recounted in 
the Gospel according to St Matthew: ‘For to everyone who has will more be given, and he will have an abundance. 
But from the one who has not, even what he has will be taken away’(Chapter 25, Verse 29). 
46 W. Staples, and J. Dalrymple, 'Customer service in local government: an Australian experience' (2006) 
Proceedings of the 20th ANZAM (Australian New Zealand Academy of Management) Conference on 
"Management: Pragmatism, Philosophy, Priorities", 6-9 December 2006, Central Queensland University. 
47 N 5 above. 
48 A. Goldsmith ‘Informal resolution of police complaints in Australia: Building better understanding or mere 
bureaucratic convenience’ (2000) 17 Law in Context: A Socio-Legal Journal 1. 
49 L. Nader. The life of the law: anthropological projects. (California: University of California Press, 2002). 
50 S. Gilad, ‘Accountability or expectations management? The role of the ombudsman in financial regulation’ 
(2008) 30 Law & Policy 2. 
51 N 38 above. 
52 N 5 above. 
53 N 11 above. 
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complainants and public bodies.54 A question remains, therefore, about whether shifts towards more 
managerial, informal, and consumerist models of redress weaken or enhance the protections available 
to citizens. Indeed, in this regard, Adler has argued that internal measures – rather than external 
mechanisms – may offer the best means of securing justice in administration.55 
 
The ombudsman’s role 
 
This article argues that managerialist approaches have influenced the practice of UK ombudsman 
offices, and that this presents challenges and opportunities. The ombudsman can be seen as a nested 
institution,56 whose institutional context means that broader reforms of public administration – 
particularly the growth of NPM discussed above – have influenced the way in which the ombudsman 
works and defines its role. Evidence of the significance of managerialism for ombudsman offices can 
be seen in the role they have played in the development of internal complaint systems. As early as 1993, 
the Local Government Ombudsman in England published its Axioms of Good Administration, with 
guidance on the design of complaints procedures. The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman 
has published similar Principles for Remedy, while the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman has 
published a Statement on Principles of Good Complaint Handling. The latter document, in particular, 
shows signs of being influenced by NPM, with principles such as ‘user-focused’, ‘seeking early 
resolution’, and ‘deliver improvement’ at its heart. In addition to adopting NPM tropes in offering 
guidance to public bodies, ombudsman offices have themselves been influenced by private sector 
practices emphasising speedy and cost effective resolution. 
 Indeed, Seneviratne has described the ‘modern purpose’ of ombudsman offices as the resolution 
of complaints, rather than investigation and reporting.57 Bondy et al. have charted how informal 
resolution has become a mainstream approach for UK ombudsman offices, with questions raised about 
its clarity and fairness.58 As Goldsmith has pointed out, informal resolution has been driven by the 
popularity of Alternative Dispute Resolution and managerial concerns with controlling demand and 
effective use of resources.59 Gill et al. found that ombudsman offices were increasingly devoting more 
                                                          
54 For further discussion see S. Roberts and M. Palmer, Dispute processes: ADR and the primary forms of 
decision-making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
55 M. Adler. ‘A socio‐legal approach to administrative justice’ (2003) 25 Law & Policy 4. 
56 The idea of ‘nesting’ and ‘nested institutions’ refers to the way that ‘the behavior of units in any subsystem is 
inexorably affected by the structure of the system within which the subsystem is nested’. See S.  Blavoukos and, 
and D. Bourantonis, ‘Nested Institutions’, in R. Biermann and J. Koops (eds.), Palgrave Handbook of Inter-
Organizational Relations in World Politics (London: Palgrave, 2017), p.304. 
57 M. Seneviratne. Ombudsmen: Public services and administrative justice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
58 M. Doyle, V. Bondy, C. Hirst. The use of informal resolution approaches by ombudsmen in the UK and Ireland: 
A mapping study (London: Hot off the press, 2014). 
59 N 48 above. 
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attention to speedy case disposal.60 A brief glance at the annual reports of UK ombudsman offices 
demonstrates that NPM-derived techniques such performance targets, KPIs, and customer satisfaction 
have been thoroughly incorporated into the practice of ombudsman offices. The emphasis on customer-
focused complaint handling can be viewed positively, particularly given concerns about the timeliness 
of ombudsman offices’ investigations.61 However, the potential issue is that efficiency rather than 
fairness becomes the motivating value of ombudsman offices62 and that the ombudsman becomes a 
private adjudicator on transactional matters between consumers and service providers, rather than a key 
part of the constitutional system for citizens redress.63 
 
B. Lesson-learning and the ombudsman: opportunities and risks of the managerial approach 
 
Learning from complaints and the ombudsman’s ‘domain perception’ 
 
Gulland has argued that public bodies’ complaint handling has emphasised resolving complaints, rather 
than using them to learn,64 despite longstanding calls for them to be used in this way.65 Ombudsman 
offices, on the other hand, have found an opportunity in the NPM reforms’ emphasis on using 
complaints for lesson-learning. As Smith notes in the context of police ombudsman offices, lesson-
learning refers to learning from mistakes drawing on principles of organisational learning imported 
from the private sector.66 The opportunity this presents for ombudsman offices is that of escaping the 
tension that has existed between its two traditional roles: fire-fighting and fire-watching.67 Indeed, much 
of the debate in ombudsman scholarship has been about whether ombudsman offices should focus on 
providing individual redress or adopt a more systemic function.  
This article argues that lesson-learning and the importing of organisational learning 
perspectives into complaint handling has presented ombudsman offices with the means of redefining 
their traditionally constrained ‘domain’.68 A ‘domain’ refers to how organisations present themselves 
in order to be seen as legitimate by other institutions. As institutions which are nested within both 
                                                          
60 C. Gill, J. Williams, C. Brennan, N. O’Brien. The future of ombudsman schemes: Drivers for change and 
strategic responses (Birmingham: Legal Ombudsman, 2013). 
61 N 571 above. 
62 C. Gill and N. Creutzfeldt,  ‘The 'ombuds watchers': collective dissent and legal protest amongst users of public 
services ombuds’ (2018) 27 Social and Legal Studies 3. 
63 R. Kirkham, B. Thompson, T. Buck, ‘Putting the ombudsman into constitutional context’ (2009) 62 
Parliamentary Affairs 4. 
64 J. Gulland, ‘Independence in complaints procedures: lessons from community care’ (2009) 31 Journal of Social 
Welfare & Family Law 1. 
65 For example, J. Allsop and L. Mulcahy, ‘Dealing with Clinical Complaints (1996) 4 Quality & Safety in 
Healthcare 2. 
66 G. Smith, ‘Citizen oversight of independent police services: Bifurcated accountability, regulation creep, and 
lesson learning’ (2009) 3 Regulation & Governance 4. 
67 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings. Law and Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
68 S. Gilad, ‘Exchange without capture: The UK financial ombudsman service’s struggle for accepted domain’ 
(2008) 86 Public Administration 4 
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broader public administration and the administrative justice system, ombudsman offices are inevitably 
influenced by and required to define themselves in relation to wider contextual trends. Lesson-learning 
is a useful concept for ombudsman offices, because it bridges retrospective accountability and 
prospective regulation69 and allows ombudsman offices to claim that they provide data about consumer 
preferences of public services, at the same time as feeding back management information for service 
improvement.70 The managerial idea of lesson-learning, therefore, provides ombudsman offices with a 
language that can be drawn on to manage the tension between individual redress and accountability, 
and systemic remedy and regulation. As Gilad argues in relation to the Financial Ombudsman Service, 
ombudsman offices’ institutional positions must be carefully delineated in order to achieve legitimacy 
within regulatory spaces.71 Lesson-learning has therefore been a feature of managerialist discourse that 
has been useful as ombudsman offices increasingly seek to influence, and show their relevance for, 
public service provision.  
This adoption of lesson-learning is not without consequences. One of these is that 
accountability mechanisms are ill-suited to organisational learning.72 Accountability systems focused 
on blame allocation are often shallow, narrow in focus, and limited in resources, whereas learning 
requires an examination of systems, actors and processes that can be complex and expensive. A dynamic 
form of accountability focused on learning, therefore, requires a different methodology and this presents 
a challenge for ombudsman offices’ traditional approach. A key element identified in the literature is a 
move away from command and control to acting as partners and advisers.73 This perspective conforms 
to the paradigm of responsive regulation, based on trust and cooperation, which dominates modern 
regulatory practice.74 Indeed, attempts to enhance the learning potential of complaints can be seen as 
attempts to develop quasi-regulatory strategies in the complaint handling sphere.75 Writing in the 
context of health complaints, Beaupert et al. argue that responsive regulation is becoming a hallmark 
of complaint system governance with traditional adjudication replaced by more strategic regulatory 
interventions.76 Thus, while lesson-learning represents an opportunity for ombudsman offices, it also 
requires a shift in mind-set and practice.  
 
 
 
                                                          
69 N 66 above. 
70 C. Hodges, ‘Consumer ombudsmen: better regulation and dispute resolution’ 15 ERA Forum 4.  
71 N 68 above. 
72 D. Greiling and A. Halachmi, A, ‘Accountability and organizational learning in the public sector’ (2013) 36 
Public Performance & Management Review 3. 
73 Ibid. 
74 R. Bouwman, M. Bomhoff, P. Robben, and R. Friele, ‘Patients' perspectives on the role of their complaints in 
the regulatory process’ (2016) 19 Health Expectations 2. 
75 N 74 above. 
76 F. Beaupert, T. Carney, M. Chiarella, C. Satchell, M. Walton, B. Bennett, and P, Kelly. ‘Regulating healthcare 
complaints: a literature review’ (2014) 27 International journal of health care quality assurance 6. 
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The risks of lesson-learning  
 
The following paragraphs analyse the challenges surrounding learning from complaints. Gill identifies 
three barriers to the ombudsman’s learning role: (i) the complexity of bringing about change in public 
administration and the empirical evidence suggesting caution in this area; (ii) the contested nature of 
the ombudsman’s role and the potential challenge to its legitimacy; and (iii) limitations in terms of 
capacity, resources and expertise.77 In addition, a number of conceptual and methodological problems 
face the apparently simple idea of learning from complaints.  
  Allsop and Mulcahy, for instance, highlight that the relationship between complaints and 
service failures is complex (some failures do not lead to complaints, some complaints are without 
foundation).78 A further challenge is in disentangling learning points from complex personal accounts. 
Goodman and Newman suggest complaints are unlikely to be representative of broader service 
failures,79 while Christianns-Dinglehoof et al. found that a very small percentage of adverse incidents 
in a healthcare setting lead to a complaint being submitted.80 This issue is acute in relation to elderly, 
socio-economically excluded, and ethnic minority communities, which are less likely to complain.81 
The unrepresentativeness of complaint data risks distorting service provision towards the needs of the 
most vocal.  
Despite some case studies showing that learning is potentially powerful,82 several studies have 
reported that complaints are not widely used in this way.83 Defensiveness has been a particular concern 
in the health sector where Bourne et al. have established the significant effects that being subject to a 
complaint has on doctors’ well-being and clinical practice.84 These findings are replicated elsewhere 
and indicate that personal impacts of complaints may limit their value.85 Davies and Cleary point to 
other impediments to using feedback from service users, including: organisational barriers (lack of 
commitment, competing priorities, and lack of infrastructure), professional barriers (public servants not 
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being trained to deal with complaints), and expertise barriers (lack of expertise in collecting data and 
interpreting data).86 
If learning is to move beyond case studies, complaint systems must make more systematic use 
of aggregate data.87 This requires standardised data, however, standardised approaches to recording, 
categorising, and analysing complaints are lacking.88 According to Gillespie and Reader, the absence 
of an established taxonomy for collecting data is a critical limitation on learning from complaints.89 
While some taxonomies have been proposed they have yet to be widely deployed.90 Even with 
systematically designed complaint taxonomies, problems remain around measurement validity, 
categorisation, and capturing qualitative issues. 
In summary, while lesson-learning allows the ombudsman to fit in with NPM paradigms and 
assist the institution’s search for a relevant modern ‘domain’, it also entails risk: complaint investigation 
is a relatively straightforward activity; improving public administration through lesson-learning is more 
complex.  
 
C. Managerial methodologies: performance management and benchmarking in public services 
 
The case study in Part III shows the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman using novel methodologies 
such as performance management and benchmarking to achieve improved complaint handling and 
lesson-learning. This section provides an overview of these management techniques.  
 
Performance management  
 
NPM reforms sought to disaggregate policymaking and delivery, open up public services to private 
providers, and shift public bodies from provision to commissioning.91 In this context, performance 
management becomes increasingly important as increased delegation requires more data for control and 
accountability.92 Springing up alongside this complex landscape of service provision were a host of 
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bodies to regulate ‘within government’.93 Systems for overseeing public services, therefore, came to 
rely on ‘management by numbers’.94 This involves setting performance indicators that can take a 
number of forms, such as intelligence systems, target systems, and ranking systems, and monitoring 
reported performance against indicators.95 Askim et al. define performance management as the 
measurement, analysis, and communication of performance information with the goal of 
improvement.96  
The effectiveness of performance regimes has been widely questioned as a result of unintended 
consequences and ‘gaming’ by bureaucrats,97 and Cuganesan et al. point out that performance 
management is a controversial activity that entails significant risks for performance.98 Well known 
problems include ratchet effects (the tendency for targets to be inflated where they have been met), 
threshold effects (the tendency for performance to cluster around minimal performance), and output 
distortion (gaming approaches).99 The apparently straightforward notion of setting standards and 
reporting against them, therefore, is in fact underpinned by controversy over what can be measured, 
measurement errors, and dysfunctional effects.100 
 
Benchmarking  
 
Benchmarking is the process of measuring performance and comparing it against industry leaders.101 
Benchmarking was developed in the private sector, but has increasingly been used in public services.102 
In local government, benchmarking has been seen as a means of fostering a private sector mentality and 
an example of NPM approaches to governance.103  In theory, the absence of competition should make 
benchmarking in the public sector attractive.104 However, the concept of ‘performance’ is more complex 
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and difficult to measure in public services, so that the reception of benchmarking initiatives has not 
always been positive.105  
Scholars distinguish between compulsory and voluntary benchmarking depending on whether 
participants have chosen to take part.106 In addition to variations in the degree of ‘vertical’ management 
of benchmarking schemes, distinctions have been made about benchmarking processes. Ammons and 
Roenigk identify two types: comparison of statistics (where statistics are simply compared and 
performance gaps identified) and best practice benchmarking (where comparison of statistics is the 
beginning of a process of analysis).107 Ammons and Roenigk argue that best practice approaches are 
rarely used in the public sector.108 As with performance management more broadly, a wide range of 
challenges face benchmarking schemes including data issues (measurement and comparison) and 
resource issues (the cost associated with best practice approaches). 
 
Effectiveness and bureaucratic responses 
 
Do the above strategies enhance performance? Many answers to this question are negative.109 Indeed, 
while collecting data is a ubiquitous activity, using it for improvement is not,110 and performance 
management regimes rarely lead to improved performance or more accountable government.111 At the 
same time, there are clear indications about ways in which performance management and benchmarking 
initiatives can be designed to minimise risk and enhance effectiveness. Hood, for example, argues that 
intelligence systems (rather than targets or rankings) reduce incentives for gaming and are more likely 
to be effective.112  
Bevan and Hood note that many performance measures are more useful as ‘tin openers’ than 
‘dials’ (i.e. they provide a prompt for investigation rather than an end point).113 This is reflected in the 
notion of best practice benchmarking in which statistics are only the starting point for analysis and 
comparison and effectiveness is assessed holistically. Networks and ‘learning forums’ are important in 
this context to allow data to be converted into action-oriented responses.114 In common with literature 
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on regulation, performance management and benchmarking scholarship tends to suggest that more 
collaborative systems are more effective.115 The literature also includes a number of typologies to 
describe bureaucratic responses to performance management regimes (e.g. Bevan and Hood’s ‘saints, 
honest triers, reactive gamers, or rational maniacs’), which call attention to the variegated bureaucratic 
responses that require to be managed in performance management systems.116 
 
II. CASE STUDY 
 
This part of the article presents a small-scale case study of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman’s 
(SPSO’s) expanded role and its implementation in the local government sector. The purpose of the case 
study is to provide an illustration of the article’s arguments with regard to the influence of 
managerialism on UK ombudsman practice and an empirical springboard for defining and refining the 
growth of the ‘managerial ombudsman’. 
 
A. Methodology and limitations 
 
19 interviews were conducted. This included: 3 SPSO staff; 3 senior local government officials; 10 
members of the Local Government Complaints Network; 2 staff of Audit Scotland; and 1 advocacy 
service representative. Individuals were selected using purposive sampling, on the basis that they were 
able to provide relevant data.117 Interviews were conducted in 2017, mostly face-to-face and some by 
telephone. The average interview length was 55 minutes. Interviews were transcribed and subjected to 
thematic analysis.118 Interviews were supplemented by documentary analysis. Annual complaint reports 
were collected from local authorities, along with legal and policy texts and SPSO publications such as 
guidance, annual reports, and online resources. 
The methodology had some limitations. A more detailed case study could have been developed 
by interviewing a wider range of local government staff. Similarly, the views of complainants and other 
key stakeholders were not collected. Importantly, the case study does not provide an exhaustive 
empirical account of the SPSO’s developing approach and instead is exploratory in nature and aimed at 
allowing for the development and refinement of broader theoretical conceptions of the ombudsman’s 
role in the modern state. 
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B. Case study findings 
 
The case study is in four sub-sections. The first considers developments in the SPSO’s role and the 
agendas driving reform. The second examines how the SPSO’s new responsibilities have redefined its 
‘domain perception’. The third analyses new methodologies developed by the SPSO. The fourth 
considers local government responses to the SPSO’s new role.  
 
The SPSO’s developing role: consumer-focus and learning 
 
The SPSO was created by the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman Act 2002. The SPSO was set-up as 
a ‘one-stop-shop’ for complaints about all public bodies falling within devolved competence. In effect, 
it merged four jurisdictions: central government, health, local government, and housing. At the heart of 
the one-stop-shop were ideas of consumer focus and simplification, and this development can be seen 
as part of the systemic-managerial phase described in Part II. The one-stop-shop has grown in scope 
over time with new jurisdictions incorporated: higher education (2005); water and prisons (2010); 
Scottish welfare fund (2015); and social work (2016).  
Attention turned to internal complaint handling when the Scottish Government commissioned 
the Crerar Review.119 Crerar proposed that the ombudsman’s role should be to oversee a standardised 
public service complaint system; effectively, a regulator of internal complaint handling. Crerar was 
highly critical of existing arrangements for complaint handling, finding them not fit-for-purpose. He 
recommended that, in designing a new system, the SPSO should be guided by: simplicity, consistency, 
timeliness, and local resolution. The goals of Crerar’s proposed reforms reflect the managerial 
aspirations of previous Charterist reforms (a) to make it easier for people to get redress and (b) for 
public bodies to learn from complaints. Indeed, Crerar explicitly stated that his proposals build on 
previous customer-focused initiatives, such as Customer First.  
 The consumerist and managerial emphasis of policy continued with the Scottish Government’s 
Fit-For-Purpose Complaints System Action Group, chaired by Douglas Sinclair.120 The Sinclair Report 
developed proposals in relation to the oversight and simplification of complaint procedures. The 
Sinclair Report recommended basing reforms on two principles: simplification and consumer focus. It 
continued to emphasise a systemic-managerialist perspective by taking a ‘whole system view’, and 
arguing that the arrangements for complaints should be based on the SPSO’s existing approach that 
‘have the consumer at the centre’. Most of Sinclair’s recommendations were implemented in the Public 
Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 (see Box 1). 
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New duties to: 
 
• publish a statement of complaint handling principles;  
• monitor practice and identify trends in how public bodies handle complaints;  
• promote best practice in complaint handling; and 
• encourage cooperation and sharing of best practice amongst public bodies. 
 
New powers to: 
 
• publish model complaint handling procedures for public bodies; and 
• issue a declaration of non-compliance where a complaints procedure does not conform to a 
model complaint handling procedure. 
 
 
Box 1: key provisions of s. 119 of the Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 
 
 The SPSO’s strategic plan shows how the SPSO describes its priorities following its expanded 
functions.121 It emphasises consumer focus and learning as the heart of the SPSO’s mission. The plan 
contains 6 objectives. Objectives 1 and 2 refer to the conduct of ‘user-focussed’ investigations, with 
objective 1 referring to providing ‘individual benefit to our customers’. Objectives 3, 4, and 6 
meanwhile refer to improving public services: objective 3 in relation to complaint systems, objective 4 
in relation to better complaint handling, and objective 6 in relation to improving substantive public 
services. Finally, objective 5 refers to accountability and providing a ‘best value’ service that is 
operationally efficient. The language used in the plan draws on consumerist and managerialist language, 
through its emphasis on ‘users’, ‘customers’, ‘best value’, ‘learning’, and ‘improvement’. 
 
The SPSO’s domain perception: investigator, regulator, or improvement partner? 
 
The provisions of the 2010 Act have required the SPSO to reflect on how it situates its role within public 
administration. SPSO interviewees believed these provisions radically developed understandings of the 
ombudsman’s role: 
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‘I used to sit and get lectured about… what we do in Scotland was not what an ombudsman 
does. And I said, no… You’re doing what an ombudsman did.  We’re doing what an ombudsman 
does… You’re behind us now.’ (O1)122 
 
That the new role is perceived as ground-breaking is reflected in the SPSO’s ambition to be ‘recognised 
and consulted as a world-leading ombudsman service’.123 As we shall see, however, what exactly the 
role involves and how it is perceived have been matters which the SPSO has had to delineate carefully. 
The SPSO implemented the 2010 Act by creating the Complaints Standards Authority (CSA), 
an internal team operating within the SPSO. The choice of name is intriguing, in that it suggests a 
regulatory function (c.f. other regulators such as the Advertising Standards Authority). However, SPSO 
interviewees said they did not consider the CSA to be involved in regulation. Instead, they distinguished 
CSA activities from other forms of oversight: ‘We're not audit, we're not regulation, we're not 
inspection’ (O2). Instead, interviewee O1 argued that the role was to ‘monitor’: 
 
‘A regulator… is someone who applies a set of rules with penalties. A monitor is someone who 
sees what’s happening and alerts people... The fact that [the Scottish Parliament] asked for 
that function to be part of the ombudsman’s role… helped me to redefine what the ombudsman 
does.’ (O1) 
 
The SPSO, therefore, had to ‘redefine’ its role, as it incorporated new functions within its existing remit 
as complaint investigator. In doing so, the SPSO’s approach involved creative ambiguity, hinting at a 
regulatory role, while also distancing itself from it. It seems likely that this caution and ambiguity can 
be explained by the SPSO’s desire to maintain a legitimate domain of operation in relation to other 
institutional stakeholders, such as public bodies, auditors, and regulators. 
 An important way in which the SPSO has managed to recast its domain is through emphasising 
its ultimate goal as public service improvement through partnership and collaboration. Supporting 
learning rather than adopting a coercive regulatory approach is how ‘what the ombudsman does’ (O1) 
is redefined:  
 
‘We certainly do have a role in encouraging, facilitating… sharing good practice, and driving 
up the standards of complaints handling.’ (O2) 
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The SPSO’s new domain, therefore, is re-imagined as involving cooperative forms of oversight 
described as ‘monitoring’ and ‘partnership’. This was commented on by interviewee O1 who described 
the way in which the 2010 Act had been implemented: 
 
‘If I had… said ‘[The Scottish] [P]arliament’s given me this power’, I might have been able to 
force something through. [However] I think the relationship between the ombudsman and the 
public bodies would have been damaged… you can’t really move from there to partnership.’ 
(O1) 
 
The key partnerships developed in the implementation process were (a) with other oversight bodies, 
who are expected to monitor performance and (b) with public bodies whose complaint handling 
performance is being overseen. Local authority interviewees largely agreed that the SPSO’s approach 
was collaborative: 
 
‘We’ve now got a… closer relationship… we’re involved… more proactively with the 
ombudsman in trying to drive up standards… [It is] a genuine partnership’ (LA1). 
 
At the same time, the creative ambiguity noted above was picked up by stakeholders. For example, the 
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE) responded to the SPSO’s consultation on its 
strategic plan as follows: 
 
‘[The strategic plan] suffers from a confusion of approaches as to SPSO’s mission. Is it:-  
 
 a regulator? 
 [a] part of an integrated public sector, focussed on improving outcomes for the 
community? 
 [an] independent body who impartially determines complaints in a quasi-judicial 
manner?124 
 
In SOLACE’s view, the ombudsman should focus on the second bullet point, with the ombudsman 
working ‘in partnership with the public sector to ensure that its work is targeted towards achieving real 
and tangible outcomes’.125 This perspective, therefore, seeks to shift the SPSO further towards a 
managerial approach, where the role is one of supporting improvement in public services. Arguably, 
this is indeed where the SPSO has been focusing its efforts, but there remains a tension as a result of 
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the SPSO’s variegated remit – which it now defines as ‘oversight’ and ‘development’ – and the 
concurrent need to maintain impartiality, act as an authoritative monitor, and work in partnership.126  
 
New methodologies: standards, performance management, and collaboration 
 
The SPSO’s expanded role has required it to develop new methodologies, heavily influenced by 
managerial practices, including (a) the design of complaint procedures, standards, and performance 
indicators (b) the use of benchmarking to identify best practice and raise standards, and (c) the use of 
professional networks and other collaborative tools of governance. 
 The major initial task for the CSA was to develop Model Complaint Handling Procedures 
(CHPs). The CHPs involve two stages. Stage 1 is ‘frontline resolution’ and Stage 2 is ‘investigation’. 
Stage 1 complaints should be resolved within 5 working days, while Stage 2 complaints should be 
resolved within 20 working days. If a complainant remains unhappy after receiving a Stage 2 response, 
they may complain to the SPSO. Additionally, CHPs contain guidance about responsibilities within the 
complaint process, supporting customers, and recording, reporting, and learning from complaints. The 
CHPs amount to a detailed set of standards for public bodies.  
Not surprisingly, given the policy process leading up to the 2010 Act, consumerist and 
managerialist matters featured heavily in SPSO interviewees’ perceptions of the benefits of the CHPs, 
including: cost reductions; quicker, simpler, and more consistent user experience; and better quality 
complaint handling outputs. SPSO interviewees also noted that the CHPs had begun to prompt culture 
change in valuing of complaints: ‘I don’t think it’s there yet, but it’s getting there.’ (O2). Local authority 
interviewees also identified a feature of the CHPs being about improving consumer experience: ‘It’s 
clear. It’s transparent; and the key thing for the complainant is that it’s simple.’ (LA7). Improving the 
timeliness of responses through frontline resolution was seen as enhancing efficiency and customer 
satisfaction: ‘There’s a known link between kind of speed of resolution and satisfaction.’ (LA5). Local 
authority interviewees highlighted a number of managerial benefits of simplified procedures: it was 
easier to manage complainants’ expectations (LA9); complaint procedures between departments had 
been harmonised (LA8); the use of Customer Record Management systems had been facilitated (LA8); 
and a stronger emphasis had been put on performance management (LA2). Local authority interviewees 
also agreed that the CHPs had begun to allow better learning from complaints: 
 
‘We've started down the path of changing the culture… [from]‘complaints are a nuisance’ to 
‘actually they're useful’… Now it has… a place in the organisation.’ (LA4) 
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The SPSO can therefore be seen to have focused on creating a rational, simple, consistent, consumer-
focused, and efficient process, where complaints can be more easily recorded, monitored, and reported 
as a source of management information.  
 Once the CHPs were introduced, the SPSO developed performance indicators to monitor how 
they were working. These were designed in partnership and subject to a ‘huge amount of to’ing and 
fro’ing’ (LA3). There are 8 performance indicators (PIs) as shown in Box 2. 
 
 
1. Number of complaints /1000 population 
2. Number of complaints closed at stages 1 and 2  
3. Number of complaints upheld/ partially upheld/ not upheld at each stage 
4. Average response time in working days at each stage 
5. Number and percentage of complaints closed within the timescales 
6. Number and percentage of complaints where an extension has been authorised 
7. Statement to report customer satisfaction with the complaints service  
8. Statement outlining improvements to services as a result of complaints 
 
 
Box 2: The SPSO’s performance indicators  
 
The PIs measure (a) the quantity of complaints and the stage at which they are closed (PI1 and PI2) (b) 
the outcomes of complaint procedures (PI3) (c) the timeliness of complaint procedures (PI4, PI5, PI6) 
and (d) customer satisfaction (PI7) and learning (PI8). Only PIs 4 and 5 can be considered to be targets, 
since there are clear timescales in which complaints should be resolved. The other PIs conform to the 
performance measures used in ‘intelligence systems’ and are ‘tin openers’ that allow for comparison 
between local authorities and self-reflection.127 
The decision not to use targets as PIs was part of a deliberate strategy to create a bottom-up 
approach to monitoring and improvement. Indeed, the focus of the PIs is primarily for use as 
management information by local authorities. The SPSO’s guidance states: 
 
‘Local authorities are required to assess complaint handling performance to provide assurance 
in relation to their performance, to facilitate continuous improvement and to assist in 
benchmarking performance between local authorities’128.  
 
                                                          
127 N 100 above. 
128 SPSO, Performance Indicators guidance (Edinburgh: SPSO, 2015). 
24 
 
Interviewees also made clear that external oversight was expected to play a relatively limited role, with 
the emphasis on ‘self-governing’ (LA4).   
The SPSO used two techniques to realise this: the creation of complaint handling networks and 
the use of collaborative benchmarking. The networks were seen by the SPSO as key vehicles for 
implementing the new arrangements: 
 
‘[We decided] to concentrate most of our efforts [on]… the people who actually make things 
work in the complaints world, which was the beginning of the creation of the networks of 
complaint handlers. And we engaged with people there.’ (O1) 
 
The creation of the complaint network was seen by interviewees as a successful aspect of the new 
system. Interviewees stressed that the network offered an opportunity to review performance in a non-
threatening way that supported improvement: 
 
‘We’re not banks. We’re not competing with each other. We are trying to identify common 
ground and share best practices.’ (LA7) 
 
Although performance data was published, the fact that deliberation took place in private was an 
advantage, as this removed the pressure that would exist if complaint data became a matter of public 
debate: 
 
‘It’s been very much about using it as an internal resource… everyone’s committed to 
improving so there’s no naming and shaming…’ (LA2) 
 
This non-coercive approach is also evidenced by the fact the SPSO has yet to declare a local authority 
non-compliant. 
The role ambiguity identified above meant that, although most interviewees saw the SPSO’s 
approach as one of partnership, a tension was identified between working collaboratively and 
authoritatively: 
 
‘… it comes back to this idea of a tension… between the SPSO wanting… the local authorities 
to go over to the two stage process, and being reasonably prescriptive about it, but also saying, 
look you do this however works best for your organisation…’ (LA3) 
 
LA6 felt that the SPSO was overly directive in its approach and had not adopted the kind of partnership 
approach recommended by SOLACE: 
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‘I wish there was just more of that kind of… ‘we’re all working as one bigger organisation to 
improve customer experiences’ rather than ‘here’s a new process, you have to follow it.’ (LA6) 
 
Others noted that while local authorities were supposed to be ‘self-governing’ some fundamentals had 
been imposed: 
 
‘We're kind of left to do self-governing as well as benchmarking and improvement, and I think 
it's very difficult when you disagree on the fundamentals...’ (LA4) 
 
This mixed approach, combining authoritative standards with engagement and the fostering of 
cooperation was also noted by SPSO interviewees: ‘We took quite a bit of time taking people with us, 
but very firmly saying, you know, there are red lines here.’ (O1) 
   
Bureaucratic responses and organisational learning 
 
The data presented above shows that the response of local authorities to the SPSO’s new role has been 
largely positive. However, there was a view that resistance to complaints remained within local 
authorities: 
 
‘… if you have a cultural [approach], ‘I don’t want a complaint’, ‘that’s not a complaint’… 
then it’s extremely difficult… people see a complaint as a hand grenade with the pin taken out.’ 
(LA7) 
 
A large part of the resistance that complaints engendered was that they were taken personally, rather 
than as learning opportunities: 
 
‘You’re asking people to admit that a mistake was made and they could do things better. So it 
does require… that the organisation actually does want them to [learn].’ (LA9) 
 
Interviewee LA6 noted that the ‘human challenge’ of getting people to feel differently about complaints 
remained, even if technical challenges could be resolved: ‘The other challenge is people just not taking 
the data personally… That’s a human challenge rather than a data challenge.’ (LA6) Therefore, while 
the complaint specialists who formed the bulk of our sample were positive about complaints, views in 
local government more broadly were likely to be mixed. 
 Interviewees discussed the human challenge of shifting perceptions of complaints as 
accompanied by the technical challenge of learning from complaint data. Basic compliance with the 
CHPs was unproblematic with the real question described as the ‘so what?’ (LA1): 
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‘What’s important in all this stuff we’re doing, the capturing and recording… has got to be, 
how does it improve services for Joe Bloggs, for the customer… The numbers are all very well, 
but what’s changed?’ (O2) 
 
Learning from complaints was – despite being the ultimate goal of the SPSO’s reforms – a challenge, 
which all interviewees struggled with. Indeed, most interviewees identified problems with interpreting 
complaint data and understanding how data could be used to improve: ‘When you look at the 
quantitative side of things, people will say, well so what, what’s that actually telling us?’ (LA1); ‘It’s 
quite difficult for us to spot a trend at the minute’ (S3). Although ‘the theory is good’ (LA2), 
interviewees noted that it had been difficult to use complaint data for improvement: 
 
‘There was an idea when we first started analysing this that there would be patterns … [but] 
the complaints vary so much it’s quite hard to see patterns and connections.’ (LA2) 
 
Low volumes of complaints in some areas exacerbated the issue, as authorities were left with a ‘real 
variety of issues’ (LA4). The same interviewee noted that the SPSO’s expectations of learning from 
complaints was ‘really quite aspirational’ (LA4), while several noted that more resources were required 
to implement improvements: 
 
‘You might identify an improvement… it might be screaming out at you… [but] there’s no 
funding or resource or budget for it.’ (LA7) 
 
A further challenge related to the nature of what could be learned from complaints. For 
example, a number of interviewees reported that learning was impeded because of the sensitivity and 
specificity of issues: 
 
‘The whole learning from complaints issue… everybody’s quite obsessed by it… but it’s difficult 
sometimes to do… a lot of them are just more a unique set of circumstances… it’s about 
confidentiality as well and people not being identified.’ (LA 10). 
 
The tension between collecting qualitative and quantitative data was also important. While having 
sufficient data was necessary to persuade people that issues required to be addressed,  interviewees 
tended to agree that qualitative information was more useful: ‘That isn’t something you can just reduce 
to a numerical indicator really.’ (LA2); ‘Numbers are boring for people... They need to understand 
more what’s behind the numbers’ (LA6). A further question raised by some interviewees related to 
capacity in making the best use of data: 
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‘I don’t see much evidence of people managing by numbers…  It’s just getting people to actually 
give a monkeys about the information.’ (LA5) 
 
 Indeed, challenges around recording and using data frequently surfaced in local authority 
interviews, with a lack of confidence in data recording consistency between local authorities, which 
hampered benchmarking. A much-mentioned issue was the distinction between a complaint and a 
request for a service: 
 
‘Somebody would phone up to say, the bin lorry has gone past, you’ve not picked up my bin. Is 
that a complaint…?... When does a service request become a complaint?’ (LA9) 
 
This issue meant that some interviewees expressed scepticism about the extent to which comparison of 
complaints data could lead to improvements. This was compounded by differences between local 
authorities:  
 
‘We’ve got different sizes of population, we’ve got different sizes of organisation, we’ve got 
different structures… There are intricacies that the performance indicators we’ve got don’t 
necessarily weigh up.’ (LA1) 
 
 Despite identifying learning from complaints as a challenge, interviewees nevertheless 
described changes in the way complaints data were reported and used within local authorities. Indeed, 
interviewees described extensive internal reporting arrangements: 
 
‘Our complaint data is… done quarterly and reported annually… Then there are the internal 
reports that… go to our senior management team, our heads of service, our service managers.’ 
(LA10) 
 
Some interviewees also emphasised that complaints were useful for managers, for example, providing 
opportunities for scrutiny: 
 
‘There’s usually a good debate at the committee when it comes up. There are always questions 
and we usually end up having to go away and do a bit more digging.’ (LA2) 
 
Indeed, most interviewees were also able to cite at least one example of complaint data being used for 
learning in their authorities. Interviewees also noted that attempts to use data to drive learning had to 
be put in context: 
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‘What I’ll place on record here is a recognition of where we are, compared to where we were… 
This inconsistent, broken, not fit-for-purpose system, where complaints data wasn’t captured, 
wasn’t used. We are in a far, far better position now.’ (O2) 
 
‘Historically a report never went to the corporate management team… The in-depth discussions 
that go on around complaints, the sharing of information that goes on, it was never there.’ 
(LA8) 
 
SPSO interviewees also noted that learning from complaints remained a work in progress. For example, 
the SPSO has recently created a Learning and Improvement Unit (LIU). This is described in the SPSO’s 
Strategic Plan as supporting ‘authorities to take action to learn from complaints effectively and to 
implement improvements that prevent repeat service failings and address any systemic issues identified 
by our decisions’.129 The LIU is a further development of the SPSO’s work on learning from complaints, 
involving a consultancy style advice and support service. 
 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
A. Case study analysis and discussion 
 
This section analyses the SPSO’s new role and argues that it represents a significant extension of 
managerial approaches in ombudsman practice.130 This can be seen in the policy process leading to the 
2010 Act, which was driven by agendas that share a great deal with the original Citizen’s Charter 
reforms of the 1990s and the Service First reforms of the early 2000s. Placing ‘the consumer at the 
heart’ of the complaint system131 and emphasising learning and managerial improvement, situates 
reforms in Scotland as inheritors of the consumerist and managerialist ideas that have been hugely 
influential in shaping complaint handling in the UK. The emphasis on simplification and consistency is 
also in keeping with the 21st century emphasis on a systemic-managerial model, where the focus is how 
complaints procedures – as a whole – function as a system.  
 On the one hand, therefore, the SPSO’s new role can be seen as continuing broader trends. 
However, this should not obscure the fact that its expanded role and the techniques deployed to 
implement it, represent significant extensions to the traditional ombudsman approaches. That this role 
remains somewhat ambiguous came out clearly in the interview data. The balance needed between 
                                                          
129 N 123 above. 
130 A normative critique of these developments and how they can be reconciled (or not) within different 
constitutional conceptions of the ombuds’ role has previously been provided in Gill (2014), and as a result these 
matters are not considered in detail here.  
131 N 123 above. 
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impartiality, setting standards, and working in partnership arose both in how the SPSO has redefined 
its role and how it has implemented its new remit. While, in practice, the SPSO keeps an internal 
separation between caseworkers and the Complaints Standards Authority staff, at an institutional level 
these functions exist in some tension with each other. Seeking to fulfil a more multifaceted role has 
presented the SPSO with a need to carefully mark out a place in relation to its key stakeholders. Gilad 
has written about the difficulty experienced by the Financial Ombudsman Service in delineating a 
legitimate ‘domain’ of operation between courts on the one hand and regulators on the other.132 While 
the regulatory context is different for public services, the concept of domain perception is useful for 
describing the way in which the SPSO has sought to present and develop its new functions. This at once 
hints at formal authority, while mostly stressing collaborative strategies.  
 Indeed, in addition to requiring the SPSO to distinguish their role from that of others, new 
challenges have emerged in relation to the methodology the ombudsman’s office should employ. Here, 
the SPSO’s strategy can be seen to conform to principles of reflexive regulation133 and ideas about 
collaborative governance.134 Both in its oversight and its more developmental guises, the SPSO has 
emphasised a collaborative approach, using consultation, co-creation, and peer-review techniques in 
preference to more directive oversight. This is in keeping with much of the literature on the effectiveness 
of performance management and benchmarking techniques in government.135 At the same time, 
interviewees noted some tension between the need for authoritative ‘red lines’ (O1) and a desire to work 
in ‘genuine partnership’ (LA 4). This resulted in a hybrid domain perception and a hybrid methodology, 
involving elements of top-down standard setting and bottom-up service improvement.   
 It is interesting that in interviewees’ accounts the collaborative approach was seen as 
particularly effective; this accords well with modern theories of regulation, which emphasise coercion 
as a last resort.136 This does of course represent a significant move away from the ombudsman’s 
traditional role as investigator, since the kind of relationship with public bodies required to carry out 
both regulatory activities based on reflexive principles and developmental work designed around 
supporting improvements is quite different. No longer is the SPSO merely the arbiter between a citizen 
and a public body. Instead, the SPSO oversees the quality of complaint handling in public services and 
the operation and design of public services themselves, through its championing of complaint-driven 
service improvement. Despite seeking to side-step labels such as regulation, audit, and so on, it is 
nonetheless clear that the interactions with public service providers required by its new remit represent 
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133 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite. Responsive regulation: Transcending the deregulation debate. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); R. Baldwin and J. Black, ‘Really responsive regulation’ (2008) 71 The Modern Law 
Review 1. 
134 N 72 above. 
135 N 102 above. 
136 N 76 above. The approach also fits strongly within a model of regulation that seeks to devolve responsibility 
to regulatees, with regulators operating a form of ‘meta-regulation’ involving the oversight of self-regulation, See 
C. Parker, The Open Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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a shift in both operational style and mind-set. While this builds on what has previously been identified 
as the more cooperative ‘control style’ of ombudsman offices, it nonetheless represents a significant 
development of it.137  
 Thus, while investigation and reporting and informal resolution previously formed the mainstay 
of UK ombudsman practice,138 the SPSO has devised new reflexive and managerial methodologies. 
These have centred on the setting of performance indicators and the use of benchmarking. The use of 
these techniques is fascinating, since it shows the ombudsman not only working in pursuit of 
longstanding managerialist goals, but – for the first time – also deploying techniques associated with 
NPM. Indeed, the performance indicators and their predominant emphasis on outcomes, efficiency 
measures (especially timeliness), consumer satisfaction, and learning fit well with what Clark describes 
as the ‘consumer-variant’ of NPM.139 Similarly, the use of benchmarking is one of the prime examples 
of the use of private sector management methodologies in the public sector. It is in this sense – not only 
in terms of aims and rhetoric, but in terms of tools and techniques – that the case study of the SPSO 
allows us to identify particularly clearly the continuing growth of managerial approaches in UK 
ombudsman practice.  
While the case study highlights an important development in the ombudsman’s role, it should 
not be over-stated. Despite the Complaints Standards Authority role becoming a more significant aspect 
of the SPSO’s strategy and operations, complaint handling remains at the heart of the ombudsman’s 
activity. Most of the SPSO’s staff remain employed in complaint handling roles and it is from this that 
the organisation derives the credibility to deliver its wider systemic functions. This article is not, 
therefore, arguing that the SPSO’s traditional complaint handling function has been replaced. Rather it 
argues that the influence of managerialist ideas has spread from how the SPSO has conceptualised its 
casework (KPIs, an emphasis on informal resolution, etc.) to how it engages with bodies under its 
jurisdiction and sees its role in influencing and improving public services. In that sense, the case study 
shows a new phase in the development of managerial practices within the UK ombudsman sector and 
suggests an acceleration in the use of managerial tools within ombudsman practice.  
The case study research was not designed to evaluate the success of the SPSO’s new role. 
Nonetheless, it offers some indications of the opportunities and challenges inherent in it. It seems clear 
from the case study that the re-design of local government complaints procedures has been successfully 
implemented and that, among the complaints specialist and senior staff in our sample, there was 
commitment to improving complaint handling. Although there was some scepticism about how far this 
extended among colleagues, most interviewees believed that the new complaints system was beginning 
                                                          
137 M. Hertogh, ‘Coercion, cooperation, and control: Understanding the policy impact of administrative courts and 
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to engender a culture change. The technical task of simplifying complaint procedures and prompting 
local authorities to pay attention to complaints data appears to have been achieved with few problems. 
 At the same time, particularly in focusing on ‘learning’ as the key underlying purpose of the 
complaint enterprise, a number of challenges face the ombudsman. Interviewees discussed difficulties 
in both identifying and reporting on the learning from complaints, as well as more fundamental human 
and data issues that stood in the way of change. Moving from a classic investigator to a performance 
manager concerned with organisational learning in the public services, requires both a sanguine view 
of what is possible and the development of new skills, methodologies, and capacities. The design of 
performance indicators, the operation of benchmarking groups, and, underlying this, a much stronger 
emphasis on data science, including the reliable collection, categorisation, and interpretation of data all 
require a much expanded skill-set. Ombudsman offices have a long experience of drawing out 
qualitative lessons from investigations, but much less in overseeing the production and use of 
meaningful quantitative data. Here, there may be lessons to learn from embryonic attempts at making 
systematic use of health complaints data.140 
 
B. The managerial ombudsman: implications in the UK and beyond 
 
To what extent is the SPSO’s approach relevant to ombudsman offices in the UK and elsewhere? Its 
relevance is most obvious for other UK ombudsman offices, where the SPSO’s CSA has been seen as 
a model to follow. Part 3 of the Public Services Ombudsman Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, for example, 
makes provisions that replicate the provisions in s. 119 of 2010 Act.141 In Wales, similar provisions are 
included in the Public Services Ombudsman (Wales) Bill. In England, a watered down version of the 
Scottish arrangements is proposed: clause 27 of the draft Public Services Ombudsman Bill’s proposes 
only to impose a duty on the ombudsman to provide information, advice and training to promote best 
practice in complaints and for bodies under jurisdiction to take account of this. Assuming these 
proposals survive the legislative process, the UK’s devolved jurisdictions will all adopt the CSA, while 
England will adopt minor aspects of it (if the Public Services Ombudsman Bill is enacted). 
Consequently, the SPSO’s approach and the way in which it has developed ombudsman practice is of 
significant interest here.  
 Looking further afield, while the CSA appears to be unique in ombudsman practice, questions 
about the proper role of the ombudsman and the need for caution in how the role is developed are not.142 
On a global scale, the major story of the ombudsman’s development has been its flourishing as an 
institution involved in good governance and protecting human rights.143 This emphasis on human rights 
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protection has clearly not featured evenly in the development of the ombudsman: in the UK, as we have 
seen, human rights have not been prominent in debates about ombudsman reform. In Australia, the 
emphasis on developing more systemic ombudsman approaches, incorporating a range of new functions 
and methodologies such as audit or inspection144 can be seen as part of a similar, more managerial 
approach to the ombudsman’s role. In Europe, a recent influence has been the growth in ombudsman 
offices in the private sector, catalysed by the EU’s Directive on Consumer Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (2013/11/EU). O’Brien has argued that developments in private sector redress have led to 
an inappropriate focus on providing customer satisfaction amongst public services ombudsman 
offices.145 In his view, this limits the potential of public service ombudsman offices and moves the 
institution towards a narrow redress model. 
 The argument, therefore, is that the managerial ombudsman paradigm and the case study 
analysed in this article are relevant for a number of reasons. First, while the article has focused on the 
managerial trajectory of reform in the UK, similar reforms of public services have been undertaken in 
many countries across the world in the last 30 years, with systems for ‘voice’ forming a key part of 
increasing the responsiveness of public services to ‘consumers’. Second, the debate about the 
ombudsman’s role and its proper limits has been a continuous feature of ombudsman scholarship– 
especially with regard to the extent to which more systemic or more narrowly adjudicative approaches 
should predominate – and a matter of pressing contemporary concern in some jurisdictions, such as 
Australia.146 Third, looking at the issue the other way, the managerial ombudsman – incorporating the 
aims, languages, and tools of managerialism – provides a strong contrast to models globally that stress 
the rule of law, anti-corruption, and human rights.147 
 An important question, then, relates to the significance of these developments. O’Brien argues 
that the normative implications of shifts towards private sector practice and consumerisation present an 
existential threat to the public sector ombudsman.148 Certainly, the lack of prominent debate in the UK 
around issues such as the rule of law and human rights, casts the ombudsman less as a repository of 
fundamental values, and more as one of a plethora of bureaucratic actors focused on enhancing 
managerial performance. While the ombudsman’s nested position within public administration means 
that it is perhaps inevitable that these agendas will influence its practice to a degree, institutional context 
is not determinative and the ombudsman institution has at least some freedom to carve out its own 
legitimate ‘domain’.149 As things stand, however, there are strong indications that the managerial 
ombudsman approach has co-opted ombudsman offices to agendas whose philosophical underpinnings 
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– emphasising private sector practice, recasting citizens as consumers – fundamentally jar with the 
provision of justice.  
 In evaluating these issues, there is a need to distinguish between the tools and values of 
managerialism. Managerial tools such as KPIs, performance management, early resolution, 
benchmarking, and consultancy have the potential to enhance the ombudsman’s practice and to bolster 
the institution’s arsenal of techniques to bring about fairness in administration. In order to keep pace 
with modern administrative practice, it is simply not viable for the ombudsman to remain limited to 
investigation and reporting. As noted above, whether this expanded arsenal is effective remains a matter 
for further empirical enquiry, but broadening the ombudsman’s toolkit and providing new avenues for 
it to influence administration appear to be a desirable adaptation. The real question relates to the values 
of managerialism. The danger with adopting such values is that the ombudsman loses its ability to 
maintain an independent critique of public institutions, which are themselves dominated by a 
managerial ethos. A managerial ombudsman, overseeing a managerial public administration may serve 
merely as a tool for maintaining the current administrative orthodoxy rather than as a means of 
challenging it. This can be seen in the case study, with the SPSO’s heavy emphasis on efficiency and 
speed as the guiding values of Scotland’s new public service complaint system, which can be seen as 
realising long-standing consumerist and managerial reforms rather than suggesting an alternative and 
distinctive vision for bringing about fair administration. There is a need, therefore, to resist further 
encroachment of managerial values in respect of the ombudsman institution and not to allow the use of 
modern managerial tools to import values that – if allowed to dominate – will ultimately reduce the 
effectiveness of the ombudsman as a check on administration.  
 Instead, the UK ombudsman sector should reflect upon and seek to enunciate a set of values 
that allows the office’s mission to be set aside from that of the broader managerialist project of public 
administration reform. For example, although the SPSO’s CSA approach is grounded in a managerialist 
and consumerist paradigm, the model could potentially be reconciled with other philosophical 
approaches to the ombudsman’s role. For example, the Northern Ireland Public Services Ombudsman 
is the only UK ombudsman to adopt an ‘explicit’ human rights approach150 to its casework and its 
forthcoming adoption of the CSA model will provide a test case for combining the approaches. 
Certainly, there would be nothing precluding NIPSO from designing principles for complaint handling 
that focused less on efficiency, customer satisfaction, and management information and more on human 
rights, democratic participation, and citizenship. Despite its managerialist roots, therefore, the CSA 
approach may well be capable of adaptation and transplantation. The point is that the new managerial 
tools developed in the UK and exemplified in the SPSO’s current approach could be deployed in other 
contexts and in order to fulfil different values. Conversely, the UK ombudsman institution could 
usefully consider international models and the developing model in Northern Ireland in order to escape 
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being in thrall to managerial values and to resist rather than replicate the dominant logic of modern 
administration.151 
 
C. Situating the managerial ombudsman: managerialism in the broader justice system 
 
This article started with reference to Selznick’s concept of the ‘managerial judge’152 and, in this final 
section, the article argues that the development of the managerial ombudsman should be seen as part of 
a broader programme of managerial reforms of the justice system. As noted in Part I above, 
developments in the ombudsman institution can be seen as occurring in broad phases, which mirror 
wider shifts in public administration. As such, the ombudsman can again be conceived as a nested 
institution, operating within and constrained by its wider institutional context, and influenced by and 
reflecting broader patterns of change in public administration and the wider justice system. The 
connections between managerialism and reforms of the justice system have been most strongly 
advanced by criminal justice scholars. The dominant theme in this literature is to suggest that 
managerial practice in the judicial system is problematic and risks undermining the rule of law, although 
some argue that these concerns are overplayed and that managerial reforms are, in fact, required for the 
achievement of justice.153 There is broad consensus, however, that whatever its merits managerialism 
is now a core feature of the criminal justice system. 
 The influence of new public managerialism on civil and administrative justice has also been 
discussed.154 In the civil justice arena in England and Wales, the major concern has been about the way 
in which the Woolf and Jackson reforms of civil procedure, which emphasise case management, 
settlement, and the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) have led to a privatisation of dispute 
resolution.155 The drive for efficiency, cost-effectiveness and disposal of disputes is argued to 
undermine the value of public adjudication and to effectively privatise matters that are of public interest. 
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As Genn notes, civil justice reforms aimed to transform judges into managers tasked with the realisation 
of cheaper and more efficient justice system.156 
Wolff argues that changes in the judicial role have effectively transformed the judge from 
passive umpire to an activist figure managing settlement dynamics.157 In addition to focusing on judicial 
case management, several authors have considered the broader managerial structure within which 
judges work. The introduction of targets, Key Performance Indicators, and other quantitative means of 
managerial oversight have been hugely influential and in some cases inimical to the substantive goals 
of justice.158 Such concerns arise in a number of jurisdictions, with  Holvast and Doornos citing a 
manifesto produced by Court of Appeal judges in the Netherlands, in which judges complained: 
  
‘Increasingly, courts are managed like large companies, in which… the Council for the 
Judiciary acts as a "Board" and court managers as "Divisional Boards". (...) output norms and 
budgets have become dominant…. (A)s a consequence, the quality of the administration of 
justice is under pressure… and irresponsible choices have been made to meet outcome criteria. 
The judiciary is not a place for production workers...’159 
 
Macfarlane and Stratton refer to similar concerns being expressed by the Chief Justice of the Victoria 
Supreme Court, who argued that performance measures risked turning the justice system into a ‘car 
factory’ concerned only with delivering pre-determined outputs.160 Again, the encroachment of 
managerialist practice is seen as being conflict with traditional concepts of justice and future research 
will need to continue to evaluate how this conflict plays out in practice. 
 To conclude, the use of managerial language, ideology, and practices can be seen as a common 
feature of the development of the managerial ombudsman and managerial reforms of the broader justice 
system. A shared concern with ideas of proportionality, efficiency, informal resolution and settlement, 
and the use of more proactive strategies in the resolution of disputes clearly animate both the modern 
approaches of ombudsman offices and other justice system actors. The development of the managerial 
ombudsman should be seen, therefore, as going with the grain of broader justice system reform; and the 
case study presented in this article should be understood as an illustration of new, ever more proactive 
forms of managerialism in the justice system.  
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